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MoRTGAGEs-MoRTGAGEE's RIGHTS AGAINST TENANT WHo Oc-

is
the purpose of this comment to discuss possible rights of the mortgagee
or the purchaser at foreclosure sale, who stands in the place of the mortgagee, in dealing with a tenant of the mortgagor who holds under a
lease subsequent to execution of the mortgage. Only the law of those
states in which the lien theory of mortgages is in force will be considered. The problem can best be illustrated by a hypothetical case. Suppose that A, owner in fee of Blackacre, gives a mortgage of Blackacre
to B; one year later, he leases Blackacre to C for a term of IO years.
Six months later, the mortgage is in default, and B commences foreclosure proceedings which culminate in a decree of foreclosure and a
sale by the sheriff. At the sheriff's sale, either B, the mortgagee, or
D, a third party, purchases the property. We deal with the relationship
between B or Don one hand and Con the other.
cuPrns PREMISES UNDER SUBSEQUENT LEASE BY MoRTGAGOR-lt

46 Austin v. Southern Pacific Co., 50 Cal. App. (2d) 292, 123 P.(2d) 39 (1942);
Berryman v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Mo. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 542; Hargis v. Wabash R. Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 163 F.(2d) 608; Williams v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 356
Mo. 967, 204 S.W.(2d) 693 (1947); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., (D.C. Ohio 1948)
75 F. Supp. 740; Hicks v. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 207 S.W.(2d) 1000.
41 Kelly v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 737.
Summary judgment was withdrawn, however, on showing that submission to the N.R.A.B.
was subsequent to commencing the court action and that the N.R.A.B. had declined to hear
the case on this ground. (D.C. Tenn. 1948) 15 C.C.H. LAB. CAs. ,r64, 746.
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A. Before Foreclosure
So long as there has been. no default in payment, the mortgagor has
a right to lease the property and to collect all rents due under the lease.1
Unless there is a provision in the mortgage giving the mortgagee the
right to collect rents, he has no lien on them and cannot require the
tenant to pay them to him. 2 Even if the mortgage is in default it would
seem that some affirmative action must be taken by the mortgagee to
enable him to realize any benefit from the lease.3 The most common
remedy is an action to foreclose in which the court is asked to appoint
a receiver.4

B. During a Statutory Period of Redemption
After the mortgage has been foreclosed, many states, by statute, give
the mortgagor a specified length of time in which he may redeem from
the foreclosure sale,5 and until this period has expired, the purchaser
will not be entitled to an absolute deed. It is the better view that a
subsequent lease remains in effect for the duration of the redemption
period. 0 In Virges v. Gregory Co. 7 the court reached this result on the
ground that termination of a subsequeD:t lease by foreclosure and sale
would be unfair to the mortgagor, who might find on redemption that
he had lost a valuable lease.
If the tenant is bound by the lease for the redemption period, the
mortgagee will be interested in whether he may compel the tenant
to pay rent to him during this time. Generally, the mortgagor is entitled to possession and to rent during the period of redemption. 8 The
mortgagor's right to rent is clear unless the mortgagee's security can
be shown to be insufficient, and it has been held that this right con1 2 WILTSE, MoRTGAGE FoRECLosuRE, 5th ed., §560 (1939); In re Dooner & Smith,
(D.C. N.J. 1917) 243 F. 984, a!fd., (C.C.A. 3d, 1917) 248 F. 112.
2 Syracuse City Bk. v. Tallman, 31 Barb. (N.Y.) 201 (1857); Equitable Life Ins. Co.
v. Rood, 205 Iowa 1273, 218 N.W. 42 (1928).
3 Parker v. Coe, 200 Iowa 862, 205 N.W. 505 (1925); Am. Freehold Land Mtge. Co.
v. Turner, 95 Ala. 272, II S. 211 (1891).
4 Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Rood, 205 Iowa 1273, 218 N.W. 42 (1928); but note that
there is authority denying appointment of a receiver where the tenant in good faith has prepaid the rent to the mortgagor. Smith v. Cushatt, 199 Iowa 690, 202 N.W. 548 (1925).
5 2 GLENN, MoRTGAGEs, §§228, 232 (1943). Where there is no such statute, a deed is
absolute after sale.
6 8 WAsH. L. REv. 184 (1934); Williard v. Campbell, 91 Mont. 493, 11 P. (2d) 782
(1932).
7 97 Wash. 333, 166 P. 610 (1917).
STraer v. Fowler, (C.C.A. 8th, 1906) 144 F. 810; Bennes v. Waderlow, 291 Mich.
595, 289 N.W. 267 (1939); Am. Trust Co. v. Mich. Trust Co., 263 Mich. 337, 248 N.W.
829 (1933); Dailey v. Abbott, 40 Ark. 275 (1883); Kasten v. Paxton, 46 Ore. 308, 80 P.
209 (1905).
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tinues even though rents have been pledged for payment of the mortgage.0 This result is seemingly based either on the premise that "possession" by the mortgagor gives him the right to rents, or on the theory that
ownership of the equity of redemption is enough to entitle the owner
to them.10 In jurisdictions that give possession and rents to the mortgagor during the redemption period, the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale is considered to have a "lien" on the premises for the amount of his
bid and is entitled to interest on this amount during the period of redemption.11 The courts here seem to use the word "lien" to denote that
if the mortgagor does not redeem, the interest the purchaser acquires
at the sale relates back to the time of the sale, cutting off intervening
incumbrances.
Several states, by statute, provide that the purchaser is entitled to
rents during the period of redemption,1 2 but in the majority of such
states, the purchaser or mortgagee is required to account to the mortgagor for all rents received and to apply them to the mortgage debt.13
In the absence of such a statute, the only way a mortgagee may feel
reasonably assured of deriving any benefit from rents from the subsequent lease is to provide specifically in the mortgage that on default
all rents shall inure to the benefit of the mortgagee or purchaser. There
is authority that such a clause is valid and enforceable,1 4 but in some
cases such provisions have not been accorded recognition. In Capitol
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Ross1 5 it was held that an attempt by the mortgagor to waive the right to rents during the period of redemption was
invalid because of its conflict with provisions of the redemption statute.

om

re Dooner & Smith, (D.C. N.J. 1917) 243 F. 984, affd., (C.C.A. 3d, 1917) 248
F. 112.
lOibid.
11 Traer v. Fowler, (C.C.A. 8th, 1906) 144 F. 810.
12 Most of these statutes are similar. See Mont. Rev. Codes, §9448 (1935): ''Who
entitled to rents and profits. The purchaser, from the time of the sale until a redemption, and
a redemptioner, from the time of his redemption until another redemption, is entitled to
receive, from the tenant in possession, the rents of the property sold, or the value of the use
and occupation thereof." See also Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §707 (1941); Wash. (Rem.)Rev.
Stat. Ann. §602 (1932); Utah Rev. Stat., tit. §104-37-37 (1943). Such statutes have been·
interpreted as substituting the purchaser as landlord in place of the original owner. Blodgett
Loan Co. v. Hansen, 86 Mont. 406, 284 P. 140 (1930); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Pfenninghausen, 57 Cal. App. 655, 207 P. 927 (1922).
1s Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P. (2d) 770 (1938); Virges v.
Gregory Co., 97 Wash. 333, 166 P. 610 (1917); Petersen v. Jurras, 2 Cal. (2d) 253, 40 P.
(2d) 257 (1935). Contra, Ulivarri v. Lovelace, 39 N. Mex. 36, 38 P. (2d) 1114 (1934):
the purchaser obtained legal title on sale, leaving the mortgagor only an equity of redemption.
Thus the purchaser was not held accountable for rents collected.
14 Hakes v. North, 199 Iowa 995, 203 N.W. 238 (1925); Trulock v. Donahue, 85 Iowa
748, 52 N.W. 537 (1892); Bennos v. Waderlow, 291 Mich. 595, 289 N.W. 267 (1939).
15 134Kan. 441, 7 P. (2d) 86 (1932); see also In re Dooner & Smith, (D.C. N.J. 1917)
243 F. 984, affd., (C.C.A. 3d, 1917) 248 F. 112.
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The court stated that these statutes were meant to insure rents to the
mortgagor to enable him to redeem, and hence could not be waived.
Even in jurisdictions which will enforce a clause pledging rents, the
mortgagee must give notice to mortgagor and tenant that he demands
them; otherwise he cannot claim them. 16

C. After the Period of Redemption has Expired
1. Right to Possession
When the deed acquired at the sheriff's sale has become absolute,
the purchaser, whether he is the mortgagee or a third party, will be
vitally interested in his rights against the tenant under the subsequent
lease. Most cases which have come before the courts are those in which
the purchaser has endeavored to evict the tenant and acquire possession
of the premises, and it seems certain that if the tenant has been made a
party to the foreclosure action, his rights are adjudicated and foreclosed. 17
If the tenant does not appeal from the decree in the foreclosure action,
he cannot resist the issuance of a writ of assistance to put the mortgagee
or third party purchaser into possession.18 Such a ruling would appear
to be fair, since the tenant will be able to assert in the foreclosure action any equities which he may have against the mortgagee, such as a
claim for improvements, and the court can award him damages against
the mortgagor.19
If the mortgagee fails to join the tenant as a party to the foreclosure
action, there is a conflict in the cases as to whether his rights are terminated at the end of the redemption period, with decisions on each side
claiming to represent the majority view. 20 One line of authority holds
that sale by the sheriff and execution of a deed which has become absolute put an end to the tenancy created by the mortgagor. 21 Therefore, if
16 Parker v. Coe, 200 Iowa 862, 205 N.W. 505 (1925).
11 Utility Realty Co. v. Dugan, 93 Misc. 510, 157 N.Y.S. 227 (1916).
18 Sullivan v. Super. Ct. of Mendocino Co., 185 Cal. 133, 195 P. 1061 (1921).
10 The tenant benefits in being a party to the action, since he can recover any

awards
in his favor from the proceeds of the mortgage sale if a surplus is realized.
20 Am.-Italian Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467 at 471, 189 A. 118 (1937):
"We have held, following the great weight of authority and the soundness thereof is not
questioned, that unless a tenant is made a party defendant to the foreclosure suit his interest
is unaffected thereby." See also 14A.L.R. 664 (1921); 8 WASH. L. REv. 184 at 187 (1934).
Contra, Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 227 Mo. App. 1063 at 1066, 56 S.W. (2d) 801
(1933): "It is the well-settled rule in this state and elsewhere that the foreclosure of leased
premises, under a mortgage antedating the lease, nullifies and extinguishes the lease. • • ."
(lessee not joined as a party); 2 JoNES, MoRTGAGEs, 8th ed., §981 (776) (1928).
2l McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Downard v. Groff, 40 Iowa 597 (1875);
Hecht v. Dettman, 56 Iowa 679, IO N.W. 241 (1881); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Simplex
Products Corp., 135 Ohio St. 501, 21 N.E. (2d) 585 (1939).
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the purchaser wishes to continue as lessor, he must negotiate a new contract with the lessee, or in other words, have the lessee attom to him.22
In such jurisdictions, either the lessee or the purchaser may refuse to
negotiate a new contract and may abandon the lease.
A leading case supporting this theory is Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co.,23 in which the telegraph company sued to
restrain the railroad company from interfering with its telegraph wires.
The telegraph company operated its lines under a lease given by the
mortgagor subsequent to execution of a mortgage of the entire railroad.
The defendant claimed through the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
following an action in which the telegraph company had not been a
party. In spite of the great inconvenience and monetary loss to the
telegraph company, the court held that it was a mere trespasser after
foreclosure, against whom ejectment would lie without notice to quit.
The basis of the decision was that there could be no privity of contract
or estate between the lessee and the mortgagee;24 when the mortgagee
foreclosed, he was not bound to respect any rights the lessee might have
acquired through the mortgagor; nor could he enforce any rights that
the mortgagor might have had.
Other jurisdictions reach this same result:2 11 on the premise that foreclosure is actually an eviction of the tenant by title paramount;26 when
the land is mortgaged, the mortgagee acquires all the right of the mortgagor at the time the mortgage is executed, and nothing can be done to
cut down the estate as it existed at this time.27 The lease is said to be
carved out of the equity of redemption as it existed at the time the mortgage was executed, and when it terminates, the lease that is a part of it
must also terminate.28 Another reason for this result, stated in Downard v. Groff,29 is that the lessee stands in the position of the mortgagor,
and when his rights are foreclosed, the lessee is also foreclosed. Of
22 2 JONES, MoRTGAGEs, 8th ed., §982 (777) (1928); Moran v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L.
Ry. Co., (C.C. Ohio 1887) 32 F. 878; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Zeidler, 233 Ala. 328, 171 S.
634 (1936); Reichert v. Bankson, 199 Ill. App. 95 (1916).
2a (C.C.A. 6th, 1898) 90 F. 379.
24 See also McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams,
227 Mo. App. 1063, 56 S.W. (2d) 801 (1933); Stone v. Hammons, 347 Mo. 129, 146 S.W.
(2d) 606 (1941); Winnisimmet Trust, Inc. v. Libby, 234 Mass. 407, 125 N.E. 599 (1920);
Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242, 4 S.Ct. 420 (1884).
2 ;; McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860). Some courts hold the lease terminated
and do not mention the nonjoinder. Hale v. Nashua & Lowell R.R., 60 N.H. 333 (1880);
Jones v. Thomas, 8 Black (Ind.) 428 (1847).
20 Moran v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (C.C. Ohio 1887) 32 F. 878.
27Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935).
28 Reichert v. Bankson, 199 Ill. App. 95 (1916).
20 40 Iowa 597 (1875); see also Dolese v. Bellows.Claude Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57,
245 N.W. 569 (1932); Jones v. Thomas, 8 Black (Ind.) 428 (1847).
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course, the tenant is no longer bound either, and the mortgagee will
lose the benefits of the lease unless he can execute a new contract with
the lessee.30
On the other hand, there is a large body of authority that holds failure to join a lessee in the foreclosure action prevents the decree (and
expiration of the redemption period) from terminating the lease.31 In
Wheat v. Brown82 the tenant under a subsequent lease was successful
in maintaining his possession against the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, since the court found that the decree of sale could not terminate
the rights of any parties except those actually before the court in the
foreclosure proceeding. There is authority that if the tenant is not
joined in the foreclosure suit, there has, in effect, been no eviction.
Hence, as between the parties, the tenant is entitled to possession until
in some affirmative way his rights have been terminated.33 In Dundee
Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell84 the court stated that as the mortgagor
had the right to lease the premises, and as the purchaser acquired his
title only through the foreclosure proceeding, the lessee was entitled
to be heard in that proceeding. Therefore, the only way in which the
mortgage lien can be asserted against the lease is in a foreclosure action,
and this is impossible unless the lessee is made a party to the action.
In support of the termination theory, it has been urged that property
will not bring as high a price if the immediate right to possession is not
guaranteed. But this depends on the facts of the case, as a valu~ble
lease will often enhance the property value,35 It would appear that the
courts allowing possession to the lessee who has not been made a party to
the foreclosure action have reached a sounder result. As the mortgagee
knows that joinder of the lessee will assure the termination of his
rights, while nonjoinder will allow the tenant to maintain possession,
ao This explains why some courts do not consider the tenant a necessary party to the
foreclosure action. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860); Tyler v. Hamilton (C.C. Ore.
1894) 62 F. 187. But compare cases that consider the tenant a necessary party in that he
is held entitled to redeem. Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 S. 108
(1913).
31 Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Lowenthal, 13 N.J. Misc. 849, 181 A. 897 (1935); Zimmerman v. Walgreen Co., 215 Wis. 491, 255 N.W. 534 (1934); Stellar Holding Corp. v.
Berns, 143 Misc. 781, 257 N.Y.S. 369 (1932).
32 3 Kan. App. 431, 43 P. 807 (1896).
33 Lockhart v. Ward Dewey & Co., 45 Tex. 227 (1876); Am.-Italian Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467, 189 A. 118 (1937).
34 65 Fla. 15, 61 S. 108 (1913).
3 5 Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Lowenthal, 13 N.J. Misc. 849, 181 A. 897 (1935); but
compare Am.-Italian Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467 at 472, 189 A. 118 (1937):
"But it is also true that both an advantageous or disadvantageous lease may deter certain
class[es] of bidders. There may be those who are interested in the property for some particular
or special purpose requir~g immediate possession."
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the mortgagee may act according to his best interests when the foreclosure suit is filed. The tenant should not be heard to complain, since
he is doubly safeguarded; if he is made a party, he may assert any
claims he may have; if not a party, he has the benefit of his contract
in that he remains in possession. It is also interesting to speculate on
whether the courts which hold that the tenant is not relieved from the
terms of the lease if not joined would permit the tenant to intervene
in the foreclosure action and ask to have the lease terrninated.36

2. Right to Rents
Since there has been less litigation concerning rents, a more difficult
question is raised when the mortgagee wishes to hold the tenant for
rents falling due after the sheriff's deed has become absolute. Those
states in which the lessee must yield possession to the purchaser will
refuse to allow him the right to collect rents.37 This result is natural
in light of reasoning that there is no privity of contract between the
mortgagee and tenant, for if the tenant's rights are terminated by foreclosure, it follows that he cannot be forced to remain in possession and
comply with the obligations that bound him under his lease.
The question of joinder or nonjoinder of the lessee would again appear to be of prime importance. In New York, it seems clear that the
lessee who has not been joined in the foreclosure proceedings remains
liable for rents corning due under the lease. In the leading case of
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co.,38 where the court withdrew
the lessee as a party to the foreclosure action and the property was sold
subject to the lease, the mortgagee purchased and conveyed to the plaintiff, who demanded rent from the lessee. In awarding rents to the
plaintiff on the theory that the tenant remained bound by the lease,
the court held that the only way in which the tenant's obligations can
be terminated is by eviction; if he is not joined in the foreclosure action,
ao See Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Childs Co., 230 N.Y. 285, 130 N.E. 295 (1921).
In this case the lessee had been made a party to the foreclosure action, and a judgment of
foreclosure and sale had been served on him. The decree provided that the property be sold
and the lessee forever barred from any interest in it. The mortgagee later moved to discontinue the action against the lessee, and despite the lessee's opposition to the motion, the
property was sold subject to the lease.
37 See Moran v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co., (C.C. Ohio 1887) 32 F. 878 at 886:
" • . • as no reversion vests in the mortgagee under such circumstances, he cannot distrain
or bring an action, either at law or in equity, for the rents payable by the tenant. • • .";
Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57, 245 N.W. 569 (1932); Roosevelt Hotel
Corp. v. Williams, 227 Mo. App. 1063, 56 S.W. (2d) 801 (1933); Winnisimmet Trust,
Inc. v. Libby, 234 Mass. 407, 125 N.E. 599 (1920); Teal v. Walker, Ill U.S. 242, 4 S.Ct.
420 (1884).
38 230 N.Y. 285, 130 N.E. 295 (1921). For discussion of this case see note 36, supra.
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such an eviction can never take place. The basis of this result is that
the interest actually passing at the foreclosure sale is the entire interest
of the mortgagor at the time the mortgage was executed, less the leased
estate. This gives the purchaser only a reversion as- against the lessee,
and he becomes the landlord in place of the mortgagor by operation of
law. In effect, the relationship is the same as would result if the lease
had been made prior to the mortgage. One must inquire as to the extent to which the New York court relied on a state statute in reaching
its decision,39 since Justice Andrews clearly stated that the court was of
the opinion that the foreclosure sale was a grant of a reversion within
the meaning of that statute. It is submitted that the court would have
reached the same result without use of the statute, however. The statute
deals with the remedy available to the grantee of a reversion and is
used to bolster that part of the decision allowing the mortgagee to collect rents. Its use was unnecessary to support the doctrine that the interest sold at the sheriff's sale is the reversion of the mortgagor.
Prior to the decision in the Childs case, the case authority in New
York was clear that a purchaser was bound by the lease when the
lessee was not a party to ·the foreclos1:1re suit,40 and since the decision
in the Childs case there has been little doubt that the tenant is bound
to pay rent to the purchaser. Some of the later decisions quote the same
statutory authority cited by Justice Andrews, 41 but other cases reach a
like result without mentioning it;42 this lends support to a· conclusion
that reliance on the statute is unnecessary.
It is to be noted that the rule in New York is reciprocal, and the
purchaser is bound by all covenants in the lease favorable to the tenant,43 thus suggesting that the purchaser cannot later foreclose against
the lessee. The mortgagee must determine the result he wishes to
achieve, for a joinder of the lessee as a party44 or a disaffirmance of the
39 49 N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) §223: "Rights where property or
lease is transferred. The grantee of leased real property, or of a reversion thereof, or of any
rent, the devisee or assignee of the lessor of such a lease .•. has the same remedies, by entry,
or otherwise, for the nonperformance of any agreement contained in the assigned lease for
the recovery of rent .•. as his grantor or lessor had, or would have had, if the reversion
remained in him."
40 Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Twenty-First St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., II0 Misc. 126,
180 N.Y.S. 3',8 (1920); Commonwealth Mtge. Co. v. DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33, ll9
N.Y.S. 781 (1909).
41 Mutual J;,ife Ins. Co. v. Gotham Silk Hosiery Co., Inc., 179 Misc. 557, 39 N.Y.S.
(2d) 310 (1943), affd., 266 App. Div. 844, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 514 (1943).
. 42 Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N.Y. 354, 186 N.E. 862 (1933); Dold
Packing Corp. v. Kaplan, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 390 (1942), affd., 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 776 (1943).
43 Stellar Holding Corp v. Berns, 143 Misc. 781, 257 N.Y.S. 369 (1932).
44 Utility Realty Co. v. Dugan, 93 Misc. 510, 157 N.Y.S. 227 (1916).
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lease by a receiver45 will amount to the eviction necessary to terminate
the lease.
As in the cases dealing with possession, it would appear that the rule
formulated by the New York decisions reaches a sounder result than
those terminating leasehold interests upon foreclosure. The mortgagee
is given an opportunity to take advantage of a lease that may enable
him to realize the full amount of the mortgage lien. On the other
hand, the tenant is protected in being afforded an opportunity to claim
-damages for a termination of the lease or to enforce the terms of his
bargain. The only objection on the tenant's part might be that he desires to have the mortgagor only as his landlord. This objection should
be considered insignificant, however; if this were the wish of the tenant, a provision should be inserted in the lease forbidding assignment.
If such a provision is shown, the courts would be unlikely to allow an
assignment by 9peration of law. 46 There seems to be no reason to release the tenant from the terms of his contract, since he is assured all
the advantages that he has bargained for in being protected in his right
to possession and enforcement of all covenants binding the landlord.
Outside New York there is little or no authority concerning rents
in those jurisdictions which hold that nonjoinder of the tenant prevents
termination of the lease. While it is uncertain what action these courts
would take in a fact situation similar to that presented in the Childs
case, they should reach a similar conclusion. It would be unthinkable
to hold that foreclosure fails to give the purchaser possession, and on
the other hand to rule that the tenant is not obligated to pay rents to
someone. The mortgagor can no longer claim the rent, since his
claims have been foreclosed, thus leaving only the purchaser, who
now stands in his place, as the person to whom an accounting should
be made.
There are intimations that other states will extend the nonjoinder
doctrine to cover the rent situation as is done in New York. In Wheat
v. Brown41 the decision points out that while the tenant could not be
evicted, if he failed to pay rent the purchaser would have a lien on
crops grown on the land. Furthermore, statements that the lessee must
observe all rights acquired by the purchaser may indicate a leaning to4:; Monroe-King & Gremmels Realty Corp. v. 9th Ave.-3lst St. Corp., 233 App. Div. 401,
253 N.Y.S. 303 (1931).
40 JoNES, LANDLORD AND TENANT, §466 (1906): "An ordinary covenant against subletting and assignment is not broken by a transfer of the leased premises by operation of
law but the covenant may be so drawn as to expressly prohibit such a transfer, and in that
case the lease would be forfeited by an.assignment by operation of law.''
47 3 Kan. App. 431, 43 P. 807 (1896).
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ward the same result. 48 An eviction for breach of covenants may be
the only remedy for obtaining possession in jurisdictions which follow
the nonjoinder doctrine.

3. Possible Protective Measures
The mortgagee will wish to consider all possibilities that may aid
in securing to him the benefits of valuable leases negotiated by the
mortgagor. The first mode of action that might suggest itself would be
to include in the mortgage an after-acquired property clause covering
a future lease. Again, there is a sparsity of case authority to aid in determining if such a clause will achieve the desired result. In Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams49 the mortgage included a provision
pledging and assigning all rents accruing, to further secure mortgage
bonds. After execution of the bonds, a lease was given for certain
rooms in an office building on the mortgaged premises. The mortgage
was foreclosed, and the purchaser tried to enforce the lease. The court
held the provision assigning rents did not operate to aid the purchaser,
as foreclosure extinguished the lease although the lessee had not been
joined; hence no further rents could accrue under it. The case is authority for the proposition that a lease is not after-acquired property
within the meaning of an after-acquired property clause. This case was
decided, however, in a jurisdiction that expressly adheres to the termination on foreclosure theory. Other courts which adopt the same policy
would probably reject an express assignment of the future lease by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee, as well as the after-acquired _property provision; if the lease is carved out of the equity of redemption, when it is
extinguished all rights created under it must also terminate. The mortgagee would, in effect, extinguish his own claim to rents, which would
actually be a part of the rights he had extinguished by his foreclosure
action.
Another possibility is suggested by Union Inv. Co. v. McDonough,50 where the mortgagor leased several rooms in a building on the
mortgaged premises. Later he sold part of the land, but not the portion
on which the building stood. Still later, the portiqn on which the building stood was sold subject to the lease. The mortgage was then foreclosed, and the court ordered the premises sold in parcels until the
mortgage was satisfied, the sale to be held in the inverse order of alienation by the mortgagor. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the
Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 S. 108 (1913).
227 Mo. App. 1063, 56 S.W. (2d) 801 (1933).
uo 94 N.J.L. 130, 109 A. 301 (1920).
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parcel on which the building was situated attempted to evict the lessee,
but relief was denied on the ground that all the purchaser of this parcel
had acquired from the mortgagor was a reversion. Since sale of the reversion in this parcel brought a sum sufficient to satisfy the mortgage
lien, the tenant's rights remained unaffected.
This might suggest to the mortgagee a way in which he could benefit from the lease. If the court could be persuaded to order a sale of
only that parcel of the premises representing the mortgagor's present
interest, namely, the reversion and right to rents, the sale should leave
the existing leasehold estate unaffected. The purchaser would then be
in the position of the mortgagor and should be able to enforce all rights
that the mortgagor may have had. Since the mortgagor could assign
or convey these rights to a third party,51 the same result could be
reached by operation of law. Courts following the doctrine that nonjoinder leaves the rights of the lessee unaffected should have no trouble
in reaching such a result if the tenant is not a party to the action. Indeed, in the Childs case the court did order a sale of the mortgaged
premises subject to the lease, thus reaching the same result as that
suggested above. The big problem facing the mortgagee would be in
persuading the court to order the sale by parcels; this might be difficult
in light of judicial statements that it is impossible for the court to order
a sale subject to such a lease.52

D. Conclusion
In some states little can be done to assure the mortgagee any benefits
unless he can enter into a new lease with the tenant. However, in
other jurisdictions means are afforded the mortgagee by statute, by specific provisions in the mortgage, or by nonjoinder of the tenant to control in some measure the ultimate relationship of the parties. As has
been pointed out, questions concerning rent may be of first impression
in many of these states, but the result which the court would reach may
be predicted with some accuracy from the cases dealing with possession
by the lessee.
Charles E. Becraft, S. Ed.
51 Land Mtge. Inv. & Agency Co. v. Turner, 95 Ala. 272, 11
52 Sullivan v. Super. Ct. of Mendocino Co., 185 Cal. 133, 195

S. 211 (1892).
P. 1061 (1921).

